

TOP SECRET

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REVISION OF NIE 11-3-55 FOR GUIDED MISSILE

CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-4-56

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CONCLUSIONS

MILITARY

8. We believe that, generally speaking, the personnel strength of Soviet and other Bloc forces will remain substantially unchanged during the period of this estimate. However, the over-all effectiveness of these forces will increase, mainly because of the following factors:

a. - c.

d. Generally improved and modernized weapons available to Soviet ground forces, together with changes in organization and tactics designed to adapt these forces to nuclear warfare.

"New intelligence has strengthened our previous estimates that the USSR has an extensive guided missile program. We estimate that the USSR is now producing guided missiles for operational use, which provides a significant increment to over-all Soviet military capabilities."

(Paras. 103, 144)

10. During the period of this estimate the Bloc air defense system will probably be strengthened by greater operational experience and by the introduction into operational units of new fighter types (including all-weather), new anti-aircraft weapons, improved early warning and GCI

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

equipment, and guided missiles. However, in view of the increasing capabilities of offensive weapons and improved techniques in counter-measures, Soviet air defense capabilities will probably remain inadequate to prevent attacking forces from reaching critical target areas of the USSR.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

GUIDED MISSILES¹³

89. "We believe that the strategic requirements of the USSR have dictated a major effort in the field of guided missiles. From evidence of a large number of personalities and activities believed to be involved in the Soviet missile program, recent statements of Soviet leaders regarding guided missiles, reported air defense sites around Moscow, and other evidence, we have concluded that the USSR is engaged in an extensive guided missile program on a high priority. Furthermore, our considerable knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the war-time German missile experience and evidence of Soviet capabilities in related fields has convinced us that the USSR has the basic scientific and technical capabilities to support a comprehensive missile research and development program. The USSR also has an adequate economic base for a sizeable production program.

¹³ "For a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, including estimates of the dates at which time various types of missiles might appear in Soviet operational use, see NIE 11-12-55 "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs" published 20 December 1955; and NIE 11-5-56 "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs" to be published in July 1956."

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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We have concluded that the USSR now has missile systems in all categories* in at least limited operational status. We believe that the Soviet guided missile capability has been growing and will continue to develop during the next several years. However, we have limited intelligence on the specifics of the missile types the USSR is presently developing, or may now have in operational use."

V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH

SIZE OF FORCES, SCALE OF EFFORT, TRENDS

103. During the period of this estimate the personnel strength of Bloc forces-in-being will probably remain substantially unchanged.
The major weapons changes will be the increases in the number and types of nuclear weapons, in aircraft, especially bombers and all-weather fighters, in "guided missiles," and in long-range submarines. There will also be progressive modernization of weapons and equipment, particularly those incorporating electronic guidance and control. Limitations on Bloc armed forces during the period of this estimate will derive from:

VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR

OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES²⁶

143. At the present time, it would be technically feasible for the USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-range

* Surface-to-Air
Air-to-Surface
Air-to-Air
Surface-to-Surface

²⁶ No estimate of the success of the offensive operations described in this section can be made without considering the effects of the actions of opposing forces.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

aircraft and from submarines. The USSR could at present have V-1 type missiles with nuclear warheads for launching from submarines, and by late 1955 could have for this purpose a subsonic guided missile with a maximum range of 500 nautical miles. We believe that it will not be within Soviet capability within the period of this estimate to attack continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory.

add significant effects

144. "If the USSR in fact develops the guided missiles which we have estimated to be within its capabilities, the following possibilities for attack would exist during the period of this estimate:

a. In 1955-1956, from launching sites within the periphery of the USSR, targets could be reached in all of Western Europe and the United Kingdom except the Iberian peninsula and Ireland, and all of the Middle East except the southern part of the Arabian peninsula. In the Far East, these weapons could reach targets in Japan and Alaska. These missiles could carry small and medium yield nuclear warheads.

as written, there are no inconsistent

b. In 1958-1959,²⁸ Soviet guided missiles launched within the USSR could reach targets in Europe, North Africa, Japan, Alaska, all of Asia, Greenland, and part of Canada. These missiles could not be equipped with large yield nuclear warheads until 1959-1960.

c. In 1960-1961, Soviet ICBM's launched from within the USSR, equipped with large yield nuclear warheads could reach the major target areas of the Western World including the United States."

²⁸ "These have been estimated to be the earliest probable dates of availability of the missile described. See NIE 11-12-55 "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field" published 20 December 1955

TOP SECRET